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Abstract—Due to the ever-increasing popularity of resource-
hungry and delay-constrained mobile applications, the compu-
tation and storage capabilities of remote cloud has partially
migrated towards the mobile edge, giving rise to the concept
known as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC). While MEC servers
enjoy the close proximity to the end-users to provide services
at reduced latency and lower energy costs, they suffer from
limitations in computational and radio resources, which calls
for fair efficient resource management in the MEC servers. The
problem is however challenging due to the ultra-high density,
distributed nature, and intrinsic randomness of next generation
wireless networks. In this article, we focus on the application of
game theory and reinforcement learning for efficient distributed
resource management in MEC, in particular, for computation
offloading. We briefly review the cutting-edge research and
discuss future challenges. Furthermore, we develop a game-
theoretical model for energy-efficient distributed edge server ac-
tivation and study several learning techniques. Numerical results
are provided to illustrate the performance of these distributed
learning techniques. Also, open research issues in the context of
resource management in MEC servers are discussed.
Keywords: Mobile edge computing, computation offloading,
game theory, minority game, reinforcement learning.
INTRODUCTION
Due to restricted battery power, memory and computational
capacity, mobile devices face challenges in executing delay-
sensitive and resource-hungry mobile applications such as
augmented reality and online gaming. Mobile Edge Computing
(MEC) is foreseen as a remedy to alleviate this problem. In
MEC, the mobile edge is enhanced with analysis and storage
capabilities, possibly by a dense deployment of computational
servers or by strengthening the already-deployed edge entities
such as small cell base stations. Consequently, mobile devices
are able to offload their computationally expensive tasks to
the edge servers while requesting some specific quality of
service. This process, referred to as computation offloading,
is feasible due to the fact that edge servers are deployed in
close proximity of mobile users, specifically in comparison to
the remote cloud servers. An illustration of MEC is provided
in Fig. 1.
Notwithstanding its numerous perks, MEC suffers from
some short-comings that should be addressed for the concept
to become realizable. Most importantly, the limited radio and
computational resources of mobile edge servers shall need
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Fig. 1. Mobile edge computing and computation offloading.
to be efficiently utilized so that the users’ quality of service
requirements are met with the minimal effort. Moreover, from
the mobile devices’ perspective, the consumed energy shall
be minimized. The problem becomes aggravated when the
randomness and dynamics of wireless networks are taken into
account. The factors that contribute to this issue include, but
are not limited to, users’ mobility, random channel quality,
time-varying and random task-arrival, non-deterministic en-
ergy resources (for instance in case of energy harvesting), and
other similar variables.
Naturally, the aforementioned challenges cannot be ad-
dressed by conventional centralized resource allocation
schemes, since such mechanisms necessitate the availability
of global information at a central node. This is infeasible
to acquire in ultra-dense distributed networks. Moreover, the
computational complexity becomes overwhelming as well. As
a result, it is vital to develop distributed and autonomous
approaches, where the individual mobile devices and mobile
edge servers make decisions for the system to settle at efficient
and stable operating points. Therefore, game theory and rein-
forcement learning are considered as two mathematical tools
with great potential to address such problems.
Game theory is well-established as a classic tool to math-
ematically model the wireless resource allocation problems.
Based on the fact that many of the wireless resource al-
location problems can be reduced to distributed decision
making problems, game theory becomes an ideal fit. Game
theory focuses on strategic interactions among players and
thus eliminates the need for a central controller which is
a major advantage. As it is well-known, game theory has
two main branches: non-cooperative and cooperative. Non-
cooperative game theory studies the interactions of rational
and self-interested players that compete against each other,
and the goal is to achieve an efficient equilibrium point.
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2Important notions of equilibrium include Nash, correlated and
Walrasian equilibrium. Cooperative game theory promotes a
cooperative behavior that is supposedly beneficial to all agents;
a well-known example is coalitional games. In such games,
players form coalitions, and enforce cooperative behavior in
each coalition, so as to maximize the value of the coalition,
which is regarded as a utility measure. In addition to coalition
formation, there are also some other types of games based on
strategic cooperation. In summary, game theory offers a variety
of game models in which, each game has its own distinct set
of properties, that make them suitable for different types of
decision making problems based on the context.
Minority game (MG) is a type of non-cooperative game that
can be used to model distributed resource allocation problems
in MEC. More precisely, MG is a congestion game in which,
an odd number of selfish players choose between two actions
in the hope of maximizing their own payoffs. Only the players
landing in the minority are rewarded. The players neither com-
municate with each other nor they have any information about
the actions of the other players. Therefore, decision making is
almost entirely autonomous. The winning action is broadcast
to all players at the end of each round of play which is the
only external information provided. This lack of availability
of information calls for adaptive methods to be used in order
to determine the best action to be chosen in the next round. To
this end, the existing literature offers a significant number of
learning methods that include reinforcement learning methods
and stochastic strategies. These methods help players improve
the coordination among their actions and achieve better social
and individual welfare, by forming larger minorities [1].
The applicability of MG as a tool for modeling resource
allocation problems is quite obvious. In most congestion prob-
lems, being in the minority tends to be more beneficial. Many
wireless resource allocation problems are in fact congestion
problems, where a number of users compete for a limited
resource. If the resource is uncrowded, users are rewarded,
which is analogous to the minority being rewarded in an
MG. For instance, consider the previously mentioned MEC
system where, the offloading users attempt to utilize the
limited amount of available computational resources of the
edge servers. This scenario essentially maps to a congestion
problem, since the utility of each user depends on the number
of users using the same resource. Hence, such problems can
be easily modeled using MG. The advantages of MG include
simple implementation, low overhead, and scalability to large
set of players, which are of vital importance in a dense wireless
MEC system. More details on MG can be found in [2].
Later in this article, we provide an MG model for distributed
server activation problem in MEC where we compare the
performance of several learning algorithms used in MG.
Reinforcement learning is another well-known technique
applicable to distributed decision making. In reinforcement
learning, autonomous agents learn the best action by using the
rewards and penalties received in each round of play. Since
agents do not know which action is the best, they learn by
balancing exploration of unknown actions and exploitation of
the current knowledge of used actions. In other words, agents
use trial and error approach to maximize their utilities over the
horizon. Some well-known reinforcement learning methods
include Q-learning, learning automata and Roth-Erev learning.
Reinforcement learning mechanisms are very-well suited for
learning in MG, since adaptation to the collective action of
the other agents in the presence of information scarcity can
be achieved using such methods [1].
In this article, first we provide a concise review of the state-
of-the-art in computation offloading and efficient resource
allocation of edge servers, with an emphasis on the solutions
developed by using game theory and reinforcement learning.
Then, we explore the research outlook and open problems. To
this end, we formulate an example distributed server activation
problem as a minority game and apply reinforcement learning
to solve the game. We present numerical results on the
performance of the different learning techniques.
STATE-OF-THE-ART
In this section we briefly explore the cutting edge research in
the area of computation offloading and resource management
for MEC. In doing so, we focus on computation offloading
and resource management methods that are developed based
on game theory and/or reinforcement learning. Note that a
comprehensive survey of the state-of-the-art is out of the scope
of this article, and our goal is to capture the research trend by
reviewing some exemplary research works.
Computation Offloading
In [3], the authors consider a multi-cell, quasi-static envi-
ronment, and cast the computation offloading problem as a
dynamic sequential game. They further establish the existence
of Nash equilibrium and develop a distributed convergent
offloading scheme. In [4], the authors consider the offloading
problem with the set of mobile devices varying randomly
during the offloading period. The problem is modeled using
a stochastic game framework, which is afterward shown to
be equivalent to a potential game. The existence of Nash
equilibrium is proved and a stochastic learning algorithm
is developed. For cloud-enhanced vehicular networks with
edge computing capability, an offloading mechanism based
on a Stackelberg game is proposed in [5]. The servers and
the offloading vehicles are modeled as the leaders and the
followers, respectively. Similar to the aforementioned refer-
ences, the existence of Nash equilibrium is proved and a
distributed algorithm is designed that maximizes the edge
server’s utility while meeting the tasks’ latency constraints. In
[6], the authors investigate the multi-user offloading decision
making problem in a dynamic environment, where users’
states and offloading requests are time-variant. The number
of tasks offloaded to each server (machine) is modeled as an
a priori unknown time-varying Markov process. The authors
then formulate the offloading problem as a Markov decision
process. Online learning algorithms are developed to solve
for the optimal offloading policy for both centralized and
decentralized scenarios.
3Radio and Computational Resource Management
In [7], the authors use coalitional game theory to solve a re-
source allocation problem in MEC-enabled IoT networks with
software-defined network (SDN) capability. In such a network,
delay sensitive tasks are offloaded to the edge servers by the
IoT applications. The developed game-theoretical framework
is guaranteed to adaptively provision the available computa-
tional resources in the MEC servers in order to satisfy the
quality of service requirements of IoT applications. Moreover,
a deterministic algorithm is proposed to minimize the task
processing cost and the latency. Reference [8] investigates
joint offloading decision making and dynamic edge server
provisioning in an offloading mobile edge network with energy
harvesting capability. They model the problem as a Markov
decision process. A reinforcement learning algorithm is de-
veloped for offloading computation jobs and activating edge
servers while minimizing the overall cost and delay. The
authors of [9] propose a resource allocation mechanism using
auction theory. Therein, service providers in the mobile edge
network design contracts with the edge node infrastructure
providers. The contracts enable the edge servers to efficiently
provision their assigned computational resources and to sched-
ule the offloaded tasks in a way that the latency is minimized.
In [10], the focus is on a dynamically-changing vehicular
networks with MEC capabilities including computation and
caching. A network operator allocates computation, caching
and network resources to the vehicles for different vehicular
applications. To address high complexity, the authors develop
a deep reinforcement learning algorithm based on deep Q-
learning.
RESEARCH OUTLOOK
Despite its great potential in improving the latency and en-
ergy consumption, realizing the concept of MEC is associated
with a variety of challenges. In particular, decision making for
computation offloading as well as joint radio-computational
resource allocation are challenging. The challenge mainly
arises due to resource scarcity and distributed nature of MEC,
as well as the uncertainty and randomness in wireless net-
works. This includes, but is not limited to, the randomness
in channel quality and the amount/type of offloaded tasks. In
what follows, we briefly discuss some important problems,
including computation offloading and few other closely-related
issues. We also investigate the ability of game theory and
reinforcement learning to address the challenges and obtain
efficient solutions.
Computational Resource Allocation: As a result of being
deployed at the edge, MEC suffers from restrictions of compu-
tational resources, in particular when compared to the central
mobile cloud computing. As a result, it becomes imperative
to allocate the limited resources in an efficient manner. This
includes, but is not limited to, MEC server activation and
scheduling, load balancing, request management, task alloca-
tion, and the like. Such problems can be in particular addressed
by cooperative games, where a set of entities form coalitions to
achieve a specific goal, and then share the reward. Moreover,
by combining reinforcement learning with game theory, the
uncertainty and lack of prior information can be addressed.
Radio Resource Allocation: Enhancing the wireless net-
work with MEC complicates the radio resource management.
For instance, the necessary uploading and downlinking of
task-related data results in radio bandwidth consumption and
interference. Consequently, smart bandwidth allocation shall
need to be performed for mobile devices/servers. Moreover,
the energy consumption at the servers should be kept at
the minimum. To increase energy efficiency, servers might
share the energy resources and/or harvest ambient energy.
Such remedies however introduce uncertainty in the system,
in contrast to using deterministic power resources such as a
grid. The problem can be addressed by using models from
cooperative game theory and reinforcement learning.
Computation Offloading: While the allocation of computa-
tional resources is performed on the MEC servers’ side, mobile
devices decide about computation offloading. In essence, each
device decides which and what part of every task shall be
offloaded to an edge server. In some cases, the specific server
to which the task is uploaded can be determined by the device
as well. Moreover, mobile devices might be able to demand a
specific quality of service guarantee. Naturally, mobile devices
might compete with each other for limited computational
services, whereas each server would compete with others to
increase its number of offloaded tasks. Moreover, a conflict
arises between the set of servers and the set of devices,
since the latter requests low prices for services, whereas the
former benefits from high service prices. All such scenarios
can be modeled and solved by using competitive games and
models from economic markets. As before, a convergence to
an efficient solution can be achieved by performing the game
repeatedly and learn from the outcomes.
Information-Centric MEC: Inspired by the concept of
caching of popular files, in information-centric MEC, the data
and/or services can be saved at different edge servers to pro-
mote an efficient computation. In fact, by using this concept,
the amount of data which should be uploaded/downlinked
dramatically reduces. Naturally, not all the data/services can
be cached at every server. In addition, the service demand for
users might change over time. Thus the problem to address
is as follows: How much and which data/services shall be
saved at each server? In addition, the servers should be
motivated to cooperate with each other, so that if necessary,
the tasks/data/services can be exchange among servers. Such
problems can be addressed by using cooperative game theory,
repeated auctions, and exchange economy.
Economics of MEC Server Virtualization: Mobile net-
work operators (MNOs) or service providers (SPs) may
lease the MEC servers/resources from infrastructure providers
(InPs). The InPs then will need to virtualize their MEC
resources among different MNOs/SPs. The economics of the
virtualization of MEC resources can be modeled and analyzed
using game theory models. As an example, for a scenario
with multiple InPs and multiple MNOs/SPs, a multi-leader and
multi-follower Stackelberg game model can be formulated to
determine the equilibrium prices that the MNOs/SPs need to
pay to the InPs. In a more general scenario, virtualization of
MEC resources/servers can be combined with virtualization of
other resources including infrastructures (e.g., base stations),
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A COMPARISON OF THE STATE-OF-THE-ART
Reference Objective Model MEC type
[3] minimize users’ energy and latency cost dynamic sequential game quasi-static
[4] minimize users’ energy and latency cost stochastic game dynamic
[5] maximize utilities of users and servers Stackelberg game vehicular
[6] minimize unprocessed offloading requests Markov decision process dynamic
[7] optimize resource usage and QoS guarantee coalitional game edge IoT
[8] minimize overall cost and latency Markov decision process energy harvesting MEC
[9] minimize latency auction theory dynamic workload arrival
[10] efficient resource allocation deep Q-learning vehicular
[11] minimize servers’ energy and QoS guarantee minority game random
spectrum resources, as well as caching storage. Modeling
and analysis of such a general virtualized network under
users’ quality of experience (QoE) constraints is an interesting
research problem.
ENERGY-EFFICIENT COMPUTATION OFFLOADING
Following the previous discussions, in this section we
formulate an energy-efficient server activation problem. We
then solve the formulated problem by using minority games
in conjunction with reinforcement learning.
Consider a virtual pool of M edge computational servers,
gathered in a set M. At consecutive rounds t = 1, 2, ..., the
pool receives a fixed number of offloaded computational tasks
to perform. Tasks are delay-sensitive with some execution
deadline. At every time slot t, ct servers are active and
the offloaded computing tasks are equally divided among
the active servers. On one hand, since each task requires a
random time to be performed, the number of servers should
be large enough to guarantee an acceptable user experience.
On the other hand, initial activation of a server, as well as
performing each task, require some fixed amount of energy.
Every active server is reimbursed for its performed tasks.
Thus, the number of tasks per servers shall be large enough
to insure an acceptable revenue. Based on this trade-off, one
can determine the required number of active servers at each
offloading round so that (i) the system is energy-efficient; and
(ii) the user’s quality of experience is satisfactory with high
probability. We show this threshold number with cth, and take
it as given in this paper. An example calculation of cth can be
found in [11].
In a distributed MEC system, prior to task arrival, every
server independently decides whether to
• accept computation jobs (active mode); or
• not to accept any computation job (inactive mode).
That is, each server has two possible actions. Based on the
discussion above, desired is to have ct = cth at every offloading
round t = 1, 2, .... In what follows, we model this problem as
a minority game and use a variety of learning algorithms to
solve the game.
Modeling the Problem as a Minority Game
A MG can model the interaction among a large number of
players competing for limited shared resources. In a basic MG,
the players select between two alternatives and the players
belonging to the minority group win. The minority is typically
defined using some cut-off value. The collective sum of the
selected actions by all players is referred to as the attendance.
We model the formulated server mode selection problem as
an MG, where the M servers represent the players, with a
cut-off value cth for the number of active servers. The game
is repeated at consecutive rounds. The action of an agent i at
time t is denoted by ai,t ∈ {0, 1}. A server being active and
inactive correspond to ai,t = 1 and ai,t = 0, respectively. Thus
ct is equivalent to the attendance. If ct ≤ cth, active servers are
winners, and each receives a unit reward. In contrast, ct > cth
promotes inactive servers as winners, yielding a unit reward
for each of them. We use σ to denote the standard deviation of
the attendance value c(t). We define the volatility as σ2/M .
Note that volatility corresponds to the inverse global efficiency
(social welfare) of the MG, since smaller volatility implies
larger minority size, thereby larger number of satisfied agents.
It should be mentioned that zero volatility is considered as the
Nash equilibrium of MG.
Distributed Learning Algorithms
In an MG, the agents apply an algorithm to learn the
best action to be played in the next round of play. In the
seminal studies of MG, a distributed learning algorithm is
introduced, where each agent plays MG with the help of a
given set S of strategies. Each strategy s ∈ S specifies an
action to be played for every possible history data string.
The agents evaluate their strategies by scoring them for the
accuracy of their predictions as the game evolves, and use the
strategy with the highest score in each round [12]. Apart from
this seminal mechanism, a variety of learning algorithms are
available in the MG literature that can be used by agents to
learn the best action. Many of these algorithms fall into the
category of reinforcement learning, where the learners balance
the exploration-exploitation trade-off in order to maximize
their utilities. In addition, learning methods based on stochastic
strategies are also available where agents choose their actions
with some probability. In what follows, we introduce some of
these algorithms and their applicability in an MG setting.
• Exponential Learning: In [13], exponential learning is
applied in MG. Each agent is given S strategies, and
the agent scores each of these strategies based on the
5accuracy of its prediction of the winning action. Each
agent i selects a strategy s with some probability pi,s(t),
defined as: pi,s(t) = eγiVs,i(t)/(
∑S
s′=1 e
γiVs′,i(t)), where
Vs,i(t) is the score of strategy s at time slot t. Moreover,
γi is the learning rate of each agent. Note that, γi =
∞ corresponds to selecting the strategy with the highest
score which is the seminal MG learning algorithm.
• Q-Learning: In [1], Q-learning is applied in an MG,
where each agent keeps track of the Q-value of two
actions. Every agent i uses the following rule to update
the Q-values, where Ui,a is the utility received by agent
i as a result of some action a. This rule makes use of
the utility information (Ui) possessed by the agents in
order to learn the best action (i.e., exploitation of the
available information). The Q-learning in MG is two fold;
(i) Q-values are determined for the two actions (we refer
to this as Action-based Q-learning ) and (ii) Q-values
are determined for agents’ strategies (we refer to this
as Strategy-based Q-learning). In the second scenario,
an agent keeps track of the Q-values for each of her
strategies:
Qi,a(t+ 1) =
{
Qi,a(t) + γi(Ui(t)−Qi,a(t)), ai,t = a
Qi,a(t), O.w.
Given Q-values and some  > 0, every agent selects the
action with the highest Q-value with probability 1−, and
with probability  selects an action uniformly randomly
(i.e., exploration).
• Adaptive Strategy: Authors in [14] developed an adap-
tive learning strategy for MG. Therein, for each actions a,
each agent i calculates a parameter called attractiveness
(ti,a) defined as: ti,a = (1 − xi,a)ha + xi,aUi,a, where
xi,a is the attitude of action a, which is initially selected
randomly from [0, 1]. Moreover, ha is the fraction of
rounds in which action a has won in a given history of
the game. The action with the highest attractiveness is
chosen by the agent in the next round of the play. As
the game evolves, in each round of play, an agent adapts
her attitude values such that if agent selects action a and
wins, xi,a will be increased by some constant a+ whereas
if agent selected action a and lost, xi,a will be decreased
by some constant a−.
• Win-Stay Lose-Shift Strategy: In [15], this learning
method is presented as a simple behavioral model for
the agents playing an MG. This is a stochastic strategy-
based learning method. If an agent wins in the current
round of the game, she selects the same action in the next
round. In contrast, if the agent loses, she will choose the
other action with some probability p. Authors analytically
showed that for small enough p values, the social welfare
(i.e., volatility) of the system approaches the optimal
value. More precisely, for the MG with N odd players
and N/2 cutoff value, p is chosen such that p = x/(N/2)
where x N .
• Roth-Erev Learning: This learning method is applied in
MG in [1]. Similar to the Q-learning, an agent determines
a weight for each of her actions, denoted by qa and
referred to as action weights. However, unlike Q-learning,
qa is defined as the sum of the initial action weight and
the discounted sum of all past utility values received for
playing action a (λ is referred to as the discount factor).
Agents use the following rule to update the actions’
weight:
qa(t+ 1) =
{
λqa(t) + Ui,a(t), ai,t = a
λqa(t), O.w.
Given the values of qa, the selection probability of action
a is defined as pa = qa∑
a′ qa′
.
• Learning Automata: According to [1], learning au-
tomata can be applied as an MG learning mechanism,
by using the following rule to update the probability of
playing every action a, denoted by pa, after each round
of play:
pa(t+ 1) ={
pa(t) + γUi,a(1− pa(t))− δ(1− Ui,a)pa(t), ai,t = a
pa(t)− γUi,apa(t) + δ(1− Ui,a)( 12 − pa(t)), O.w.
Here γ and δ are known as the reward rate and penalty
rate, respectively.
• Random selection: In a random selection scenario,
agents simply select one of the two actions uniformly
at random.
Numerical Results
We choose M = 21 and cth = 10. Simulations are
carried out for 32 runs and in each run, the servers repeatedly
execute the MG for 10000 offloading periods. We compare
all aforementioned learning methods based on the social- and
individual welfare of servers as well as users’ QoE measure.
For different learning schemes, the parameters are selected as
follows, using the best values as suggested in the literature:
• Exponential learning: γ = 100.
• Q-learning: γ = 0.1,  = 0.01.
• Adaptive strategy: Initial attitude values xi,0 = xi,1 =
0.5, and a+ = a− = 0.5, ∀i ∈ {1, ...,M}.
• Win-stay lose-shift strategy: p = 0.005.
• Roth-Erev learning: λ = 0.2.
• Learning automata: γ = 0.2 and δ = 0.3.
• Seminal MG: S = 2.
In Fig. 2, we show the variations in the volatility as a function
of the parameter α = 2s/M , with s being the memory size, i.e.,
the length of the historical data used by the agents for learning.
It can be seen that exponential learning method achieves the
best social welfare (inversely proportional to the volatility),
with its lowest volatility approaching to 0. In addition to
examining the social welfare of the system, we also investigate
the performance of each learning method in terms of individual
welfare of the servers. In doing so, we illustrate the average
utility per server during the entire the game in Fig. 3. It can be
concluded that using an appropriate learning method, a near-
optimal average utility is achievable by the servers, despite not
having any prior information. Finally, in Fig. 4, we compare
the performance of different learning methods in terms of
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users’ experience. To this end, we simulate the probability
that the total time required by each server to perform all tasks,
denoted by τ , exceeds the deadline T . Naturally, Pr[τ ≤ T ] is
then the probability that no user, even the last one in the queue,
would experience a delay larger than T to have its offloaded
task done.
The learning methods such as exponential learning, adap-
tive strategy, win-stay lose-shift strategy and Q-learning that
exhibit better performance than the seminal inductive learning
method help servers achieve better coordination and thus
form larger minorities. This reduces wastage of computation
server resources and hence improves the resource allocation
efficiency. Therefore, these methods can be recommended
as more efficient and sophisticated learning rules for the
formulated MG-based server selection problem.
Extension of the Model
Since MEC networks typically consist of a variety of edge
nodes such as small base stations, macro base stations, wireless
access points, etc., the edge servers are not homogeneous
in practice. Therefore, heterogeneities in their computational
capability, power and storage should be taken into account
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when developing efficient resource allocation mechanisms. To
model such scenarios, games that incorporate different types
of players could be applied. In addition, to ensure fairness
among the servers, analyses using various equilibrium notions
need to be carried out. Moreover, mathematical tools such as
queuing theory and Markov decision processes can be used
to more accurately model the randomness in the offloading
system such as random arrival of computation tasks and the
users’ status change.
CONCLUSION
We have outlined the major challenges that arise in MEC,
primarily focusing on computation offloading. We have in-
vestigated the state-of-the-art and studied the applicability
of distributed solution approaches such as game theory and
reinforcement learning for deriving efficient solutions for
the identified challenges. Moreover, we have formulated the
energy efficient edge server activation problem in a MEC
offloading system using minority games and obtained some
preliminary results by applying a number of reinforcement
learning techniques. Extension of the model to consider several
practical aspects of the efficient resource management problem
for MEC servers has also been discussed.
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